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INSURANCE
There was a slight reduction in the amount of litigation in-
volving insurance contracts and insurance statutes during the
preceding survey period. The South Carolina Supreme Court
handed down 16 decisions relating to insurance questions; there
were no federal cases dealing with issues of South Carolina law
in this area.
An unusual number of cases- four -were reported in the
course of the survey period which concerned the long debated
rule that the mention of insurance in a torts claims case should
result in a mistrial because of possible prejudice to the defendant
and his liability insurer. The supreme court reversed and re-
manded one case for a new trial on the above mentioned ground,
but the lower court holdings in the other cases were affirmed.
I. Fnm TsmuRAoE
During the past year, the South Carolina Supreme Court was
faced with the case of Williams 'v. South Carolina Farm Bureau
Mutual Insuranoe Co.' for the second time. The plaintiffs, Wil-
liams and Robinson, were the owners of the "Ocean View Motel,"
a motel located in Cherry Grove Beach, South Carolina. The
plaintiffs leased the motel property to one Hamilton and re-
quested that he obtain an insurance policy covering the prop-
erty.2 Pursuant to such request, Hamilton got in touch with the
defendant's local agent and purchased a policy. Both the appli-
cation and the policy, however, showed the insured's name as
"Ocean Drive Motel c/o Mack A. Hamilton, Jr., Route 4, Con-
way, South Carolina." The instruments also showed that
Williams held a mortgage on the property, rather than that he
was a part owner thereof.8
The motel property and its contents were thereafter totally
destroyed by fire.4 The plaintiffs, bringing an action against the
1. 253 S.C. 53, 168 S.E.2d 794 (1969).
2. The motel property was leased to Hamilton during the beach season of
1966 with an option to the lessee to purchase the property, which option, how-
ever, the lessee was not able to exercise. In November, 1966, the plaintiffs
executed and delivered to Hamilton another lease and option to purchase, the
term thereof to run from April 15, 1967, to November 15, 1967, but Hamilton
was allowed to take possession prior to commencement of the term of his
lease for the purpose of proceeding with certain painting and repairs.
3. The name of the plaintiff, Robinson, did not appear either in the appli-
cation or the policy.
4. The fire occurred on February 14, 1967. The policy covered the build-
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defendant-insurer to collect on the policy, alleged inter alia, that
the defendant, through its agent, had knowledge of the lease
and agreement between the plaintiffs and Hamilton, and thereby
waived any defect as to the names as stated in the policy.5 At
the initial trial, the defendant company was granted a nonsuit
as to the cross-complaint of Hamilton on the grounds that he
had no insurable interest; however, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs for the full amount of the policy. On
appeal the supreme court reversed and remanded the cause for
a new trial because of procedural errors.6 At the second trial,
the plaintiffs again received a jury verdict, and the defendant
once again appealed.
On the second appeal, the defendant-appellant contended that
the evidence did not support an inference of intention to insure
the plaintiffs' property sufficient to raise a jury issue, and that
the intent of the parties should have been resolved in its favor
as a matter of law. The court reasoned that the crux of the
appellant's contention was that Hamilton intended to denominate
himself as owner of the insured property and that the minds of
Hamilton and the agent met in that regard' Anomalously,
5. Hamilton was named a defendant in the action, the complaint alleging
that he had an interest in the policy which was in excess of the interest of the
plaintiffs, but no relief was sought against him. Hamilton also served a
cross-complaint against the defendant company asserting that he had an
interest in the policy; that he, as well as the plaintiffs, was entitled to pro-
tection under the policy; and praying that he along with the plaintiffs have
judgment against the company for the face amount of the policy. There was
apparently no such legal entity as "Ocean View Motel," and consequently,
neither the policy nor the application contained any named insured.
6. See Williams v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 251 S.C.
464, 163 S.E.2d 212 (1968). See also 1969 Survey of South Carolina Law:
Insuranc, 21 S.C.L.REv. 583 (1969).
7. The defendant-appellant relied on the following testimony of Hamilton:
Q. And you anticipated that sooner or later if your plans worked
out that you would be the owner of the property and Mr. Williams
would have a mortgage on it, isn't that right?
A. That's right.
Q. So when Mr. Williams told you to take out insurance and make
him the mortgagee, that was what you were trying to accomplish,
isn't that right?
(Interruption by counsel).
Q. And that's what you meant for the insurance company to do
and instructed them?
A. That's right.
Q. And that was your intention?
A. Yes.
Q. And that is what the insurance did, isn't it?
A. Yes, sir.
Record at 66.
The defendant conceded, however, that a question of fact arose and was
resolved by the jury in favor of the plaintiffs as to whether it, through its
[Vol. 22
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however, the cross-complaint of Hamilton in the original action
was dismissed on the defendant's motion for nonsuit upon the
ground that Hamilton had no insurable interest. The court thus
upheld the lower court's decision and stated that the evidence,
as previously," created a jury issue as to whether or not the
policy was intended to insure the property owned by the plain-
tiffs, and that there was no error in the refusal of the trial court
to grant the defendant's motion for directed verdict or for
judgment non obstante veredioto.
The second assertion presented by the defendant-appellant was
that the plaintiffs should not be entitled to any interest since
there was no proof of loss filed, contrary to the requirement of
the policy.9 The evidence showed that Hamilton, upon instruc-
tion by the defendant's agent, went to the defendant company's
local office the morning following the fire and signed a loss
report or notice of loss. The trial judge concluded that the
plaintiffs, because of the applicable statute0 and the jury
finding that Hamilton was acting on behalf of and as agent of
the plaintiffs, had complied sufficiently with any requirement
as to proof of loss.
In resolving this issue, the supreme court explained that the
purpose of the above mentioned statute is to provide a method by
agent, knew at the time it accepted the application and issued the policy that
the plaintiffs were the owners of the property. The court concluded that the
testimony of Hamilton, as quoted, was not sufficient to override the ambiguities
inherent in the company's knowledge of this basic fact of ownership and in
its act of issuing the policy in the name of "Ocean View Motel." Moreover,
there was the fact of issuance of the policy in that name in contradiction of
Hamilton's testimony.
8. On the first appeal the court stated as follows:
It is sufficient to say, we think, that the evidence was in sharp
conflict as to whether the company, through its agent, had full
knowledge at the time it accepted the application and issued the
policy of the true status of the property with respect to its title
and the several interests of the various parties therein. The evi-
dence, we think, raised jury issues as to whether the company in-
tended to issue the policy either to or for the benefit of the
plaintiffs ....
251 S.C. at 469-70, 163 S.E.2d at 214.
9. The parties had agreed that the question of interest would be determined
by the trial court.
10. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 37-166 (1962) provides as follows:
When any company under any insurance policy requires a written
proof of loss after the notice of such loss has been given by the
insured or beneficiary, the company or its representative shall
furnish a blank to be used for that purpose. If such forms are not
so furnished within twenty days after the receipt of such notice,
the claimant shall be deemed to have complied with the require-
ments of the policy as to proof of loss upon submitting within
the time fixed in the policy for filing proofs of loss written proof
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which the insured can file proof of loss when the insurer's form
is unavailable.11 In the case at bar the written notice of loss
filed with the defendant company by Hamilton covered fully
the nature, the scope, and the extent of the loss for which the
claim was made, in compliance with the provisions of the
statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial judge's ruling
that the plaintiffs, by virtue of the statutory provision, were
deemed to have complied with the requirements of the policy as
to proof of loss.
12
II. LIFE, ACmENT, AND HEALTH INSURANCE
A. Continuous House-Confining Illness or Accident
The question of whether an insured must be continuously con-
fined inside the house pursuant to the house confinement
provision of his insurance policy appeared in Price v. United
Insurance Company of America.3 In that case the plaintiff-
insured suffered a heart attack in January, 1961. Subsequent
to the attack, the insured performed no work of any kind nor
did he attempt to obtain employment. The defendant-insurer
paid the plaintiff from the time of the attack until September
22, 1964, when such payments were discontinued on the ground
that plaintiff was no longer entitled to benefits under the terms
of the policy.
At the trial, the plaintiff testified that most of his time was
spent sitting around the house reading and looking at television.
He admitted, however, that he went to church almost every
Sunday, occasionally drove to the doctor's office, went fishing,
and was in the habit of individually driving downtown to get
a haircut and to buy his suits.14 The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff-insured, and the defendant appealed therefrom.
On appeal, the insurer argued that the trial judge should have
directed a verdict in its favor on the ground that the only
reasonable inference to be drawn from the whole of the testimony
11. Accord, American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Green, 233 S.C. 588, 106
S.E.2d 265 (1958).
12. The policy provided, inter alia, that the loss would be payable "sixty
days after proof of loss" and ascertainment of the amount of the loss. In
the instant case there was from the inception no question as to the amount of
the loss and, the statutory equivalent of a proof of loss having been filed
with the insurer on the date of the fire, it followed that the trial judge
correctly held that the plaintiffs were entitled to interest sixty days after the
date of the fire. See generally Columbia Real Estate & Trust Co. v. Royal
Exch. Assurance, 132 S.C. 427 128 S.E. 865 (1925) ; Berry v. Virginia State
Ins. Co., 83 S.C. 13, 64 S.E. 859 (1909).
13. 175 S.E.2d 221 (S.C. 1970).
14. Record at 17-19. See also Brief for Appellant at 6-7.
[Vol. 22
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss4/7
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was that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff had not proved that
he had been continuously confined inside the house under the
regular attendance of a physician as contemplated by the terms
of the policy. The pertinent portion of the policy relied upon by
the appellant read as follows:
The company will pay ... if the Insured suffers
"Such Sickness"15 which shall wholly and continuously
disable the Insured so as to prevent him from perform-
ing every duty pertaining to his occupation and cause
him to be confined inside the house under the regular
care and attendance of a legally qualified physician or
surgeon, during the period of disability ....
The term "confined inside the house" is hereby de-
fined as confinement of the Insured continuously inside
the house because of "Such Sickness", except that the
right of the Insured to recover under the policy shall not
be defeated because he visits his physician for treatment
or goes to a hospital for treatment when such treatment
cannot be administered in the Insured's home.' 6
Reviewing the testimony of the insured, the supreme court
stated that the only inference to be drawn from the whole of the
evidence was that the plaintiff had not been continuously con-
fined inside the house within the meaning of the policy. The
court further declared that the medical attention sought by the
plaintiff and rendered by his physician'7 did not, as a matter of
law, meet the requirement of the contract.' 8 Accordingly, the
case was remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of the
appellant-insurer.
15. The policy defined "Such Sickness" and insured the plaintiff:
[A]gainst loss of life, limb, sight or time, resulting . . through
accidental bodily injury . . . and against loss of time on account
of sickness contracted during the term of the policy, hereinafter
referred to as "Such Sickness" ....
16. Record at 12.
17. The plaintiff's physician testified that he attended the plaintiff two
times during the policy year of September, 1964, and September, 1965. The
next policy year the plaintiff was again treated twice, for dizziness and heavy
heart beating. During the third policy year the plaintiff did not see his
doctor. In the course of the fourth policy year the plaintiff saw his doctor
once and had wax removed from his ears.
18. For precedent the court relied upon Tyler v. United Ins. Co. of America,
243 S.C. 114, 132 S.E.2d 269 (1963), citing 29A Ams. Jm. Inmrance § 1530
(1960), as follows:
But even under a liberal construction of the house confinement
provision, where the insured is able to, and does, leave his house
for primarily business or other personal, as contrasted with thera-
peutic, reasons, it has generally been held that he is thereby pre-
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B. Proof of Accident
In Green v. United Insurance Company of America'9 the
plaintiff insured had been employed at a mill in Rock lill for
forty-three years. On the date in question, she worked the third
shift, returned to her home, and after retiring was awakened
that evening by severe pains in her back and left leg. Her
family physician made X-Rays which showed that she had
"narrowing of the disc spaces of the fifth lumbar and first sacral
vertebra." Thereafter, the plaintiff instituted an action on an
accident and health insurance policy issued by the defendant-
insurer in which she asked for disability income benefits of $100
a month.
At the trial the plaintiff's family physician testified on cross-
examination that there had to be an injury to the plaintiff to
cause such a disorder2"; however, there was no mention made by
the plaintiff or by any of her witnesses of any specific happening
or event which could have produced such accidental injury.
2'
The jury returned a special verdict in plaintiff's favor, upon
which a judgment in the amount of $900 was entered.22 The
The section of the policy relied upon by the appellant-insurer
protected plaintiff, inter alia, as follows:
(1) against loss ... of time resulting directly and
independently of all other causes from accidental bod-
ily injury caused by accident occurring while this
policy is in force, hereinafter called "such injury";
19. 174 S.E.2d 400 (S.C. 1970).
20. The testimony was as follows:
Q. Let me put it this way, how does a disc normally become nar-
row when there is no injury?
A. There has to be an injury, but she couldn't give any specific
incident how she hurt it
P). There is nothing anywhere to show that she was in fact in-
jured?
A. Not from her history, no.
Record at 17.
21. The plaintiff testified herself as follows:
Q. I believe you told the doctor you didn't injure yourself?
A. If I did, I don't know when.
Record at 29.
22. The cause was submitted to the jury for its determination as to whether
the plaintiff was entitled to recover under either a "confining illness" clause
of the policy, or under an "accident" clause thereof. The jury specifically
found that the plaintiff had suffered an accidental injury and that she did
not suffer an illness entitling her to recover under the "confining illness"
clause of the policy. However, it was obvious that the plaintiff was proceeding
on the confining illness theory in that nowhere in the complaint was an
accident specifically or by implication alleged.
defendant appealed therefrom.
E Vol . 22
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PART FIVE, TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS FOR
LIFE-ACCIDENT.
If "such injury" causes continuous total disability
and total loss of time within twenty days after the date
of the accident and requires regular and personal atten-
dance by a licensed physician, surgeon, osteopath or
chiropractor, other than the Insured, the Company will
pay at the rate of the Monthly Benefit stated in the
Policy Schedule for one day or more from the first
medical treatment so long as the Insured lives and is
disabled, suffers such loss of time and requires such
regular and personal attendance. 2
The appellant-insurer conceded the sufficiency of the evidence
to establish total loss of time and continuous total disability
requiring regular attendance by a physician. The insurer as-
serted, however, that there was no evidence from which it could
reasonably be inferred that such disability resulted directly and
independently of all other causes from accidental bodily injury
and that such disability resulted within twenty days after the
date of the accident, if such occurred.
In resolving this issue, the court relied upon the fact that
neither the word "accident" nor any words descriptive of such
an event appeared anywhere in the record, except for the testi-
mony of the family physician with respect to whether there was
an "injury."
2 4
Accordingly, if the plaintiff is to prevail, the verdict
in her favor has to rest solely upon such testimony on
the part of the doctor .... We give full accord to the
doctor's opinion that there had to be "an injury".
Such, however, is not at all conclusive. The doctor did
not elaborate at all upon what he meant by "an injury."
The term "injury" is frequently used simply in the
sense of "impairment". An injury is not necessarily of
traumatic origin, and even if of traumatic origin, not
necessarily of accidental origin. The doctor was not
asked and he ventured no opinion as to the origin of
the injury or just how recent or how ancient such may
or may not have been. Giving full force to his testi-
mony, we are still left in the realm of conjecture and
speculation as to the origin and duration of any injury
to the disc. To conclude from his very brief reference
23. Record at 11-13. See also Brief for Appellant at 4.
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to injury that such was of accidental origin and that
such occurred within twenty days prior to plaintiff's
disability would be indulging in the sheerest of specu-
lation.25
In conclusion the court stated that jury verdicts cannot rest
upon surmise, speculation, and conjecture. Thus, the decision of
the lower court was reversed, and the cause remanded for entry
of judgment in favor of the appellant-insurer.
C. First Monthly Premium Paid by Worthless Check
The problem of whether a life insurance policy was in force
and effect at the time of the death of the insured, where the
insured had made the initial premium payment with a worthless
check, was answered in the case of McCormick v. State Capital
Life Insurance Co.20 In McCormick the deceased-insured, George
C. McCormick, submitted an application for a life insurance
policy to an agent of the defendant and delivered to the agent
a check for the initial monthly premium. The agent issued a
receipt to the applicant and forwarded the check and applica-
tion to the home office of the defendant.27 The check was de-
posited, and the agent transferred the policy to McCormick.2"
The check was, subsequently, returned to the defendant marked
insufficient funds. The agent contacted the applicant; and as
a result of such communication, the check was redeposited. It
was, however, again returned to the insurer because McCormick
did not have on deposit sufficient funds to pay the check
Thereafter, McCormick was killed in an automobile collision,
and his parents, the beneficiaries under the policy, brought an
action to recover death benefits pursuant to the policy. The
trial court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict,
and the plaintiffs appealed from such ruling.
25. 174 S.E.2d at 402.
26. 253 S.C. 544, 172 S.E.2d 308 (1970).
27. The application contained the provision that any policy issued pursuant
thereto would not take effect unless and until it is delivered to the insured
and the first premium is paid during his lifetime. The receipt read, "Received
from George C. McCormick, twelve dollars and 80/100 cents in cash intended
to be the first premium on a proposed insurance policy for $10,000 on the life
of George C. McCormick". It also provided that, "This receipt must be for
the whole amount of the first premium and such amount must be paid in cash
to the Agent; otherwise this receipt is of no force or effect."
28. Attached to the policy was a receipt acknowledging the payment of
$12.80 on the policy issued. Endorsed on the reverse side of said receipt was
the following: "If check, draft or money order is given in payment of this
premium, the receipt shall be valid only if said check, draft or money order
is paid upon presentation."
[Vol. 2
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The sole issue on appeal was whether or not the policy was in
force and effect at the time of the death of McCormick. The
plaintiffs-appellants contended that the lower court erred in
refusing to submit to the jury the issue of whether the initial
premium of the policy had been paid in cash. The court de-
clared that, in the absence of an express or implied agreement
to the contrary, a check does not constitute payment unless it
produces payment in cash, the presumption being that the check
is accepted on the condition that it shall be paid. It was, more-
over, held in Burns v. Prudence Life Insurance C0.29 that the
mere giving of a worthless check to the insurer does not effect
the payment of a premium. If a worthless check is given for the
first premium, the coverage is never effected.80 The court con-
cluded that it is well settled that, when only one reasonable
inference can be drawn from the testimony, the question is no
longer one for the jury but one of law for the court.31 In the
case at hand, the only reasonable inference that could be drawn
from the testimony was that a check was delivered for the first
monthly premium and the check was returned twice because the
applicant did not have sufficient funds to pay the check. Con-
sequently, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, since
the check for the payment of the first monthly premium was
never paid and the insurance policy was never in effect.
III. AuTomoBimE IwsuAuxcn
A. Liability Insurance: Non-Owned Automobile Coverage
In Willis v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York 2
Charles R. Russell and his mother resided with Mrs. Russell's
father, Guy G. Scruggs, as members of his household. Mr.
Scruggs owned an automobile described in a liability insurance
policy issued to him by the defendant-insurer.83  While driving
29. 243 S.C. 515, 134 S.E2d 769 (1964). See also, 14 J. APPLEMAN, IN-
SURANCE LAW AND PRACTlcE, § 8144 (1962); Annot., A.L.R2d 630 (1956).
30. The court also cited Hare v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va.
679, 173 S.E. 772 (1934), where the court held that the fact that the insurer's
general agent entered the insured's check on the agent's records as payment,
issued a receipt as for cash, and sent his personal check to the insurer did not
constitute payment of the premium to the insurer, so as to render it liable
where the insured's check was worthless and the insurer, on being so notified,
returned the premium to the general agent.
31. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Carter, 249 S.C. 168, 153 S.E.2d 312 (1967).
32. 253 S.C. 91, 169 S.E.2d 282 (1969).
33. The policy in question provided coverage to an insured while driving
an automobile not listed in the policy with the following exceptions:
(b) this insuring agreement does not apply;
(1) To any automobile owned by or furnished for regular use to
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his mother's uninsured automobile, Charles Russell negligently
injured the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued Charles
Russell, and obtained a judgment. An action was then insti-
tuted against Mr. Scruggs' insurance carrier, the defendant.
The plaintiff appealed from an adverse judgment of the circuit
court.
The lone issue involved on the appeal was whether the exclu-
sion of an automobile owned by a member of the household of
the insured from the "non-owned automobile" coverage of the
liability insurance policy was inconsistent with the provisions
of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, and, hence,
invalid. The facts of the case fell directly within the exclu-
sionary clause of the policy, and there could be no recovery
against the defendant-insurer unless the Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act required that liability coverage be furnished
to the insured's grandson.
The plaintiff-appellant relied upon sections 46-750.31(2) and
46-750.32 of the Act. 4 The former section defines the term,
"insured," while the latter specifies the character and extent of
coverage required in automobile liability policies issued in South
Carolina. The definition of "insured" was made applicable to
uninsured motorist coverage in 196385 and the legislative in-
tention was that the insured, his spouse, and his or her relatives
residing in the same household should have the benefit of
uninsured motorist coverage at all times. 86 Therefore, Charles
34. S.C. CoDE AN. § 46-750.31(2) (Supp. 1967) provides:
The term "insured" means the named insured and, while resident
of the same household, the spouse of any such named insured and
relatives of either, while in a motor vehicle to which the policy
applies and a guest in such motor vehicle to which the policy
applies or the personal representative of any of the above.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.32 (Supp. 1967) provides:
No policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance or of
property damage liability insurance, covering liability arising from
the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle, shall be
issued or delivered in this State to the owner of such vehicle, or
shall be issued or delivered by an insurer licensed in this State,
upon any motor vehicle then principally garaged or principally
used in this State, unless it contains a provision insuring the per-
sons defined as insured, against loss from the liability imposed
by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of such motor vehicle within the United States of America or
the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest
and costs, with respect to each motor vehicle ....
35. This was accomplished by Act No. 312 of 1963. See also Pacific Ins.
Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 282, 147 S.E.2d 273 (1966).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss4/7
INSURANCE SURVEx-E
Russell, while a resident of his grandfather's household, was an
insured under the policy in question at all times, by virtue of
section 46-750.31(2) of the Act. Any attempt by the insurer to
exclude him from the full coverage provided by the policy as
required by the statute would have been illegal.8 7 The statute,
however, merely fixed Charles' status as an insured, and the
coverage afforded him by the applicable insuring agreement had
to be ascertained from the terms of the policy and the terms of
section 46-50.32 of the Act.
The plaintiff-appellant made no assertion that the accident
was covered by the terms of the policy, but alternatively, con-
tended that the insurer was required by the Act to furnish
liability coverage to Charles while he was operating his mother's
uninsured vehicle. In response to this argument the supreme
court announced that the contention was supportable only if the
Act requires insurance against liability imposed by law for
damages arising out of the use by a statutory insured of any
motor vehicle regardless of ownership. The court then inter-
preted the Act as only requiring that insurance contracts insure
"the persons defined as insured, against loss from the liability
imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of suchb motor vehicles . . .," the phrase,
"such motor vehicle," meaning those vehicles described in lia-
bility insurance policies issued in South Carolina. Since the
Act did not require the insurer to afford liability coverage with
respect to a motor vehicle not described in the policy, that part
of the insuring agreement was a voluntary contract as to which
the parties were free to choose their own terms.38 Consequently,
no conflict resulted between the controlling exclusionary clause
and the Act, 9 and the trial court's judgment in favor of the
defendant-insurer was affirmed.
37. See Pacific Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 282, 147 S.E2d
273 (1966).
38. The court further proclaimed that the plaintiffs reliance upon the
decision in Pacific Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., id., was unjustified.
In Pacific the tort-feasor was an insured under the statutory definition,
although not so under the terms of the policy; however, no exclusionary clause
was applicable. Once the tort-feasor was identified as an insured, the rights
of the parties were fixed by the terms of the contract, not inconsistent with
law, which permitted recovery. The court followed the same course in the
present case to the opposite result because an exclusionary provision, not
inconsistent with law, was applicable in this case.
39. The court cited the case of American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Kaplan, 209
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B. VaZidity of E aus nary Endorsement
The issue of which liability insurance carrier was to bear the
ultimate financial burden of the settlement of certain claims was
presented in Potomac Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co.
40
Potomac issued a garage liability policy insuring Williams
Chevrolet Company of Florence, South Carolina. While the
Company was repairing an automobile belonging to one White,
Williams provided White with the unrestricted use of a car
owned by Williams and insured by Potomac. White had in
effect an automobile liability policy with Allstate which pro-
vided that its coverage with respect to a non-owned automobile
would be excess coverage in the event that there was other
valid and collectible insurance on the non-owned vehicle. While
driving Williams' service-car, White was involved in a serious
accident. Following the accident both insurers effected a set-
tlement toward the payment of which each insurer contributed
equally, but under an agreement whereby each insurer reserved
the right to litigate the issue of where the ultimate financial
burden lay. Subsequently, Potomac instituted an action to re-
cover its contribution from Allstate, and Allstate counter-
claimed for its own contribution. Potomac appealed from an
adverse judgment rendered by the lower court without a jury.
On appeal Potomac conceded that its policy covered White
but asserted that such coverage was limited by an exclusionary
endorsement which limited the omnibus coverage and purport-
edly afforded coverage to White only under and in accordance
with the pertinent portion of the endorsement, to wit:
(b) any other person, but only if no other valid and
collectible automobile liability insurance either primary
or excess, with limits of liability at least equal to the
minimum limits specified by the financial responsibility
law of the state in which the automobile is principally
garaged, is available to such person; provided that with
respect to Coverage C, such person shall be deemed to
be a person for whom insurance is afforded, whether
or not there is any other valid and collectible automobile
liability insurance.
4 1
The lower court found the above quoted provision to be in
direct violation of the statutory law of South Carolina and,
therefore, held the attempted exclusion, or limitation of cover-
40. 173 S.E2d 653 (S.C. 1970).
41. Record at 12.
[Vol. 22
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age, void. The South Carolina Supreme Court, per Justice
Bussey, stated that the quoted exclusionary endorsement of
Potomac could not be sustained in view of the provisions of the
South Carolina Financial Responsibility Act. The court cited
sections 46-750.31 (2)42 and 46-750.3243 of the Act and proclaimed
that the provisions of these sections must be considered as though
they were written in the particular policy involved.44 The court
decided, therefore, that under the facts of the case, White, by
virtue of the statutory law, was fully covered by Potomac's
policy up to the statutory limits, in spite of the exclusionary
endorsement inserted in the policy.45 Whether the endorsement
constituted an attempt to redefine the term, "insured," in con-
travention of section 46-750.31(2) or sought to afford White
only conditional or contingent coverage, as opposed to the full
and effective coverage required by the statute, made little dif-
ference, since in either event the endorsement was invalid be-
cause it was not in accord with the statutory law.46 Thus, the
judgment in favor of Allstate was, accordingly, affirmed.
C. Uninsured Motorist Insurance
One of the most interesting cases decided during the survey
period was that of Whivimire o. Nationwide MutuaZ Insurance
C0. 47 In this case the plaintiff, a passenger, got out of a parked
car owned and operated by Raines. The plaintiff began to walk
around the rear bumper of the parked car when he heard the
noise of an approaching vehicle and at approximately the same
time saw it through the rear window and windshield of the
Raines car. Realizing that a collision between the two vehicles
was imminent, he started running from the scene. The approach-
ing vehicle- operated by Cox, an uninsured motorist - collided
with the Raines automobile, and the plaintiff was struck by one
of the two vehicles. The Raines automobile was covered by an
42. See note 34 supra.
43. Id.
44. Accord, Pacific Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 282
147 S.E.2d 273 (1966).
45. The appellant relied upon the North Carolina case of Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E2d 436 (1967), wherein an
endorsement to the same effect as Potomac's endorsement was held not to be
in contravention of the North Carolina Financial Responsibility Law. However,
the court was uncertain from the Allstate opinion whether or not the North
Carolina Act is, or is not, identical to our Act, in all pertinent particulars.
In any event, the court was not persuaded to a contrary result by that
decision.
46. For authority in support of its view, the court cited American Mffotorists
Ins. Co. v. Kaplan, 209 Va. 53, 161 S.E2d 675 (1968); and Hardware Mut.
Gas. Co. v. Celina Mut. Ins. Co., 209 Va. 60, 161 S.E2d 680 (1968).
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automobile liability policy issued by the defendant, Nationwide,
and the defendant, National Grange Insurance Company, had
in effect a similar policy insuring the injured plaintiff. Upon
the failure of the insurance carriers to pay, the plaintiff initiated
an action for declaratory judgment against both to determine
their respective liabilities. The lower court, without a jury,
held that the plaintiff was an insured under the policy of Nation-
wide, the insurer of the parked car, and that its policy provided
primary coverage for the loss. Judgment was entered against
Nationwide for the entire amount, and Nationwide appealed.
The first issue raised by Nationwide on appeal was whether
the plaintiff was an insured under its policy. The uninsured
motorist endorsement in the policy of Nationwide included in the
definition of an insured "any other person while occupying an
insured automobile." The word, "occupying," as used in the
policy was defined as "in or upon or entering into or alighting
from" the insured vehicle. Thus, in order for the plaintiff to
qualify as an insured under the policy, he must have been "occu-
pying" the insured parked vehicle at the time of his injury. It
was conceded that the plaintiff was not in or upon or entering
into the vehicle. The contention was that the plaintiff was
alighting from the automobile insured by Nationwide and was,
therefore, an insured under the policy.
The court, relying upon McAbee v. Nationwide Mutual In-
surance Co.,48 proclaimed that the term, "alighting from," was
not free from ambiguity and required a broad and liberal con-
struction in favor of the insured. Pursuant to such a construc-
tion, the court reasoned that the words "in" and "upon"
encompass situations where a person has some physical contact
with the vehicle at the time of injury. If the phrase "alight-
ing from" was limited to the physical act of descending from
the automobile, it would be meaningless, because a person would
still be in contact with the car and within the coverage afforded
under the terms "in" and "upon." The court held, therefore,
that "alighting from" must extend to a situation where the
body is no longer in contact with the vehicle.49 In the case at
48. 249 S.C. 96, 152 S.E.2d 731 (1967).
49. The court was careful to point out that where the act of alighting
from is completed is uncertain and must be determined under the facts of
each case. Its meaning must be related to the particular use of the automobile
and the hazards to be encountered from such use. It is reasonable to conclude
that coverage was intended to protect a guest against the hazards from
passing automobiles in the vicinity, while the guest, although not "in" or
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hand, at the time of injury the plaintiff was actually attempting
to escape the danger from the oncoming vehicle and had not
cleared the rear of the insured automobile. The court thus
announced that the lower court had properly concluded that
the plaintiff was engaged in "alighting from" the Raines car
at the time of his injury, within the meaning of that provision of
Nationwide's policy.5"
Since the plaintiff-respondent qualified as an insured under
both the policy of Nationwide and that of Grange, the court
also had to decide whether the 'plaintiff's loss should be paid
entirely by Nationwide or pro rata by it and Grange, the plain-
tiff's insurer. The lower court had relied upon the holding in
Wrenn & Outlaw, Inc. v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.Y'
in deciding that Nationwide provided primary coverage for the
plaintiff's loss. On appeal Nationwide argued that Wrenn was
inapplicable, since the policy provisions as construed in that
case were included in the general liability provisions of the policy
while in the case at bar the provision in question was under the
uninsured motorist endorsement. Nationwide cited Vernon v.
Harleyville Mutual Casualty Co.52 as precedent for its conten-
tion that an excess insurance clause is illegal in an uninsured
motorist endorsement because its effect is to place a limitation
upon the coverage required to be afforded by the uninsured
motorist statute. This argument would invalidate the excess
insurance clause in both policies; the pro rata provisions under
which both companies would contribute to the payment of
plaintiff's loss would thus control.
The court decided that Vernon did not sustain Nationwide's
position because the justices did not construe Vernon as holding
that "other insurance" clauses are necessarily in conflict with
the uninsured motorist statute. The court could find nothing in
the statute or the decisions which would require a holding that
such "other insurance" provisions conflict with the provisions of
the uninsured motorist statute or which would require giving
them any different meaning or application than that resulting
when such clauses are used in the general liability provisions of
a policy.53 Sustaining the decision of the trial judge, the court
50. See generally, 12 G. CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANcE LAW §§ 45:158-
159 (2d ed. 1964). See also Annot., 19 A.L.R.2D 513 (1951).
51. 246 S.C. 97, 142 S.E.2d 741 (1965).
52. 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 841 (1964).
53. The court recognized that there were decisions from other jurisdictions
in accordance with the proposition that "other insurance" provisions conflict
with the respective uninsured motorist statutes; however, the court did not
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held that Wrenn involved similar "other insurance" clauses in
the general liability provisions of the policy and was controlling
in this instance. Thus, the excess insurance clause in Nation-
wide's policy was inapplicable because the automobile occupied
by the plaintiff was owned by the named insured. The pro rata
clause in Nationwide's policy would have applied only if the
plaintiff had other similar insurance available to him and
applicable to the accident. Grange's policy did not, however,
provide the plaintiff with other insurance within the meaning of
the pro rata clause of Nationwide's policy, because Grange's
policy as to non-owned automobiles was expressly declared to be
excess and could not, therefore, be other insurance available to
the plaintiff and applicable to the accident.
D. No Action Clause
The case of Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Canal Insurance Co'
4
originated following an automobile collision involving one
Sanders and one Wilkes. Under the medical payment coverage
of an insurance policy issued to Sanders, the Travelers Indemnity
Company made payments to the occupants of the Sanders'
vehicle. At the same time, Travelers notified Canal Insurance
Company, Wilkes' liability carrier, of its subrogation claim
against Wilkes. Canal, however, disregarded this notice, com-
promised and settled the tort claims asserted against Wilkes by
the injured persons, and took from them a release purporting
to discharge Wilkes from further liability arising out of the
collision. In an action by Travelers against Canal to recover
the amount of its subrogation claim, Travelers obtained a favor-
able judgment from which Canal appealed.55
On appeal Canal relied solely upon the standard "no action
clause" in its policy which provided that:
No action shall lie against the company unless, as a
condition precedent thereto, the amount of the obliga-
tion of the insured to pay shall have been finally de-
termined by either judgment against the insured after
54. 173 S.E2d 656 (S.C. 1970).
55. In awarding judgment to Travelers, the trial court regarded as control-
ling the case of Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. James, 236 S.C. 431, 114 S.E.2d 832
(1960). However, that case did not involve the "no action" clause of a
liability insurance policy. It was an action by a subrogee insurer against
a tort-feasor who had settled with the injured party after notice of the
insurer's subrogation claim. The decision stands for the proposition that a
release procured by a tort-feasor under these circumstances will not defeat the
insurer's right of subrogation.
[V7ol. 22
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actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the
claimant and the company. 56
In reaching a decision, the court, speaking through Justice
Brailsford, cited two recent cases57 in which it recognized that
the policy provision relied upon by Canal makes it a condition
precedent to the commencement of an action against the company
that the amount of any claim or loss shall first be fixed and
rendered certain either by judgment against the insured or by
agreement between the parties with the written consent of the
company. The court concluded that the failure of Travelers to
comply with this condition precedent was a bar to the action on




The question of whether the trial judge abused his discretion
in refusing to vacate a personal injury default judgment arose
in Edwards v. Ferguson.59 The plaintiff and the defendant-
while riding in the defendant's automobile, which was covered
by a liability insurance policy issued by State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company-were involved in a one-car
collision which resulted in serious personal injuries to both the
plaintiff and the defendant. Which of the two persons was
driving the vehicle at the time of the accident was disputed, but
56. Brief for Appellant at 6-7. Admittedly, there was no compliance with
this condition of the policy in that no judgment had been obtained against
Wilkes, and no agreement determining the amount of his liability had been
signed by anyone. The compromise settlement was not an admission of lia-
bility. Instead, it stipulated that Wilkes had compromised a doubtful and
disputed claim but expressly denied liability.
57. See Sexton v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 242 S.C. 182, 130 S.E2d 475
(1963) ; Pharr v. Canal Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 266, 104 S.E2d 394 (1958).
58. Travelers urged that to sustain the defense in this case would empower
liability insurers to destroy subrogation rights of other insurers by making
private settlements and obtaining general releases. The court stated, however,
that this contention was unfounded:
The principle adopted in Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. James [see note
55 sipra] adequately protects such rights. A release taken from
an injured party in behalf of an alleged tort-feasor by a liability
insurance carrier, which in this case [Travelerr] would be no more
effective against a subrogation claim than is a release taken by
the tort-feasor himself, which was the Calvert case. Nor after
such a settlement would a subrogee who had paid less than the
injured party's loss be precluded by the rule against splitting a
cause of action from suing the tort-feasor in its own name.
The rule of reason is that "the indivisibility" rule may not be
invoked against the subrogee where the subrogor has parted with
all beneficial interest in the right of action.
236 S.C. at 436, 114 S.E2d at 835.
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the highway patrolman's official accident report indicated that
the plaintiff was the driver at the time of the accident.60 The
defendant never reported the accident to his insurer, State Farm,
and it was not until fourteen months after the wreck that State
Farm received a letter from the plaintiff's attorney wherein the
plaintiff asserted his claim and requested that the insurer's
representative make contact regarding a possible settlement.
Such settlement of the case did not materialize, and a copy of
the summons and the complaint was received by the defendant's
father who was unable to read. The case was not filed in the
office of the clerk of court until two days after the time for
answering had expired.
At the trial counsel for the plaintiff stated that he had in-
formed State Farm's representative by telephone that a sum-
mons, a notice, and a complaint had been served on the defendant
the previous day 1 ; however, the representative denied any
recollection of such conversation. The trial judge found that
the summons, the notice, and the complaint had been served on
the defendant on the stated day; and judgment was entered
against the defendant. The trial court overruled the defendant's
motion to set aside the personal injury default judgment, pur-
suant to section 10-1213 of the South Carolina Code of Laws,
on the ground that the judgment was taken through mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The defendant ap-
pealed from this adverse decision.
On appeal the court found that a prima facie showing of
meritorious defense was presented to the lower court, to wit:
(1) that the defendant was not driving the vehicle; and (2)
that, even if the defendant was driving the vehicle, the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence and recklessness. The
court, summarizing prior decisions, then stated:
60. The defendant was an alcoholic, and in his statement taken by State
Farm's representative, which was .made a part of the record, the defendant
explained:
[Pirior to meeting Sarah (the plaintiff), I had drunk about 2
half-pints of whiskey before meeting Sarah, and from the time we
left K-Mart until the accident, I had drunk about half of
another half-pint I had in my car. Sarah saw me drinking and I
was pretty drunk at the time. We left K-Mart in my car and
Sarah was driving at the time. I was just about too drunk to
drive.
Record at 22.
61. The summons and the complaint were not served upon or given to
State Farm until the plaintiff's counsel notified State Farm's representative
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This court has held that abuse of discretion arises
in cases in which:
(1) the judge issuing the order was controlled by
some error of law; or (2) where the order, based upon
factual, as distinguished from legal, conclusions is with-
out evidentiary support.
8 2
We have held that Section 10-1213 should be liberally
construed to see that justice is promoted and to strive
for disposition of cases on their merits.03
In determining whether there has been an abuse of
discretion all of the facts and circumstances must be
evaluated. If the requirements to vacate a judgment
are met the judgment should be opened and the defen-
dant permitted to answer. In order to vacate a judg-
ment there must be a showing (1) that the judgment was
taken against the defendant through his mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and (2) that
there is a showing of prima facie meritorious defense.6 4
After reviewing the entire record of the case, the court was
convinced that the trial judge had abused his discretion in failing
to vacate the judgment. Accordingly, the judgment was set aside
with leave to the defendant to answer so that the issues could be
tried on the merits.
F. Misrepresentations
In Fergusonv . Employers Mutual Casualty Co.65 the plaintiff,
injured in a collision with a truck owned by one Corbett and
driven by one Watson, obtained a default judgment against
Corbett and Watson in the amount of $7,000 for property damage
sustained. The plaintiff then commenced an action against the
defendant, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, to enforce
the payment of the judgment to the extent of $5,000 under a
policy of liability insurance issued by the defendant to Corbett
pursuant to the Assigned Risk Plan of North Carolina. The
defendant denied that the policy provided coverage and alleged
62. 175 S.E2d at 226 (S.C. 1970), quothig from Brown v. Weathers, 251
S.C. 67, 70, 160 S.E.2d 133, 134 (1968); Holliday v. Holliday, 235 S.C. 246,
251, 111 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1959); Simon v. Flowers, 231 S.C. 545, 550, 99
S.E.2d 391, 393-94 (1957).
63. 175 S.E2d at 226 (S.C. 1970). See generally Gaskins v. California
Ins. Co., 195 S.C. 376, 11 S.E.2d 436 (1940).
64. 175 S.E2d at 226 (S.C. 1970), quoting from Rochester v. Holiday
Magic, Inc., 253 S.C. 147, 152, 169 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1969); Gaskins v.
California Ins. Co., 195 S.C. 376, 379, 11 S.E.2d 436, 437 (1940).
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that the policy had been rescinded as of the date of its incep-
tion. The defendant further alleged that misrepresentations as
to the state of licensing and registering and place of principal
garaging of the truck covered in the policy were made in the
application for the policy by the insured, Corbett. As a final
defense, the defendant asserted that the policy was issued
pursuant to the Assigned Risk Plan of North Carolina, that the
insured was not a resident of North Carolina at the time of the
application for insurance, and that the plan was, therefore, not
available to him. The trial court, without a jury, held that the
policy was in full force and effect at *the time of the collision
and that the policy in question provided coverage to Corbett.
On appeal the defendant-appellant urged that it was error for
the trial judge to find that Corbett was a resident of North
Carolina at the time of the issuance of its policy. The defendant
contended instead that the policy in question was void ab initio
for the reason that it was issued to one not a resident of North
Carolina and, hence, to one not entitled to coverage under the
North Carolina Assigned Risk Plan. The Assigned Risk Plan
provides, inter alia:
The provisions of this article relevant to assignment
of risks shall be available to non-residents who are
unable to obtain a motor vehicle liability insurance
policy with respect only to motor vehicles registered and
used in this State. 6
Considering the meaning of residency within this provision,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina stated that a person's
actions and intentions as to domicile, not the duration of resi-
dency, are the determining factors. 67 Corbett testified that he
maintained an office in Tabor City, North Carolina, for the
purpose of selling produce, and also owned a peach farm in
Spartanburg County, South Carolina; that, during the years
1964-1966, he and his wife lived in a rented house near the
Spartanburg farm and supervised the operation of that farm;
and that he spent his time between the farm and his Tabor
66. 174 S.E2d at 769 (S.C. 1970), quoting from N.C. CODE AN. § 20-
279.34 (1965).
67. See e.g., Miller v. Miller, 248 S.C. 125, 149 S.E2d 336 (1966). The
court quoted from Reynolds v. Lloyd Cotton Mills, 177 N.C. 412, 99 S.E. 240
(1919), as follows:
To effect a change of residence or domicil, there must be an actual
abandonment of the first domicil, coupled with an intention not
to return to it, and there must be a new domicil acquired by
actual residence in another place or jurisdiction, with the intention
of making the last acquired residence a permanent home.
[Vol. 22
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City office, where he continued to handle all of his sales opera-
tions. Corbett testified, moreover, that he was a resident of
Tabor City, North Carolina, at the time of the application for
and the issuance of the liability policy in 1967. The court de-
termined that the question as to Corbett's place of residence was
one of fact, and that the trial judge found as a fact that Corbett,
at the time of application for and the issuance of the policy, was
a resident of North Carolina. The evidence supported the find-
ing, and the appellate court was without authority to disturb
the decision. Thus, it followed that the Assigned Risk Plan of
North Carolina was applicable to the insured.
The second issue on appeal was whether the insurer had the
right to void the policy from its inception on the ground that
it had been obtained through misrepresentation by the insured.
The appellant argued that the insured misrepresented the state
of licensing and registration and the place of principal garaging
of the truck in his application for insurance. The appellant
further contended that the misrepresentations were material to
the risk sought to be insured and that, had proper representa-
tions been made, the policy would not have been issued.
Liability insurance policies issued under the Assigned Risk
Plan of North Carolina are compulsory. 8  Such policies are
also subject to the following statutory provision:
The liability of the insurance carrier with respect to
the insurance required by this article shall become
absolute whenever injury or damage covered by said
motor vehicle liability policy occurs; said policy may not
be cancelled or annulled as to such liability by any
agreement between the insurance carrier and the insured
after the occurrence of the injury or damage; no state-
ment made by the insured or on his behalf and no vio-
lation of said policy shall defeat or void said policy.69
Relying on this provision and citing the case of Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Roberts,70 the court explained that the
primary purpose of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance
is to compensate innocent victims who have been injured by the
negligence of financially irresponsible motorists. Its purpose
is not the same as that of ordinary liability insurance which
saves harmless the tort-feasor himself. Under compulsory motor
68. Accord, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hale, 270 N.C. 195, 154 S.E2d 79 (1967).
69. N.C. CODE ANN. § 20-279 21(f) (1) (1965) (emphasis added).
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vehicle liability insurance policies the injured person's rights
against the insurer are not derived through the insured as in
the case of voluntary insurance, but are statutory and become
absolute on the occurrence of an injury covered by the policy.
In conclusion, the court held that the insurer could not, after'
an accident involving injury and damage to a third party,
cancel ab initio a policy issued in conformity with the North
Carolina Assigned Risk Plan, even though the insured falsely
represented in his application material facts as to the state of
licensing and registration and the principal place of garaging
the vehicle in question.
IV. LABILrrY ISURA-CE ON Busnss PrEMISES
In Riddle-Duckworth, Inc. v. Svulivan.71 the plaintiffs, op-
erators of a home and auto appliance business, discussed obtain-
ing liability insurance coverage for the business premises with
the defendant, Green, an experienced insurance agent. Green
was shown and informed of the uses of an elevator and was
specifically requested by the plaintiff, Duckworth, to include
it in the liability coverage to be procured. Green subsequently
procured and delivered an owners', landlords', and tenants' lia-
bility insurance policy to the plaintiff and gave assurances to
Duckworth that it afforded full coverage for the business
premises, including the elevator. The original policy was issued
for a one year period; it was renewed annually thereafter, with
Green sending a new policy each year and a bill for the premium.
Green assured the plaintiffs each time that the business was
fully covered. Duckworth received and read the policy covering
1962 to 1963, and some doubt arose as to whether coverage was
afforded for the operation of the elevator. In response to spe-
cific inquiry concerning the policy, Green informed Duckworth
that the policy provided full coverage for the elevator.
Thereafter, in May 1962, the elevator fell and injured a cus-
tomer. Duckworth immediately notified Green and asked him to
handle the claim; Green assured the plaintiff that he would
take care of the matter. Subsequently, the defendant, Sullivan,
who was then an adjuster, came to the plaintiffs' place, of busi-
ness and concluded that the policy did not provide coverage
for the operation of the elevator.72 The injured party, mean-
71. 253 S.C. 411, 171 S.E.2d 486 (1969).
72. The action was brought against Sullivan and Green, and the complaint
alleged that they were partners doing business as insurance agents under the
name of Sullivan-Green Insurance Agency.
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while, brought an action against the plaintiffs which resulted
in a verdict adverse to the plaintiffs. A suit was then brought
by the plaintiffs against the defendants to recover the amount
of the judgment; this resulted in a verdict against the defendants
for that amount from which verdict the defendants appealed. In
affirming the verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant,
Green, the court considered four issues of significance.
The first issue resolved by the court was that Sullivan had
effectively severed all connections with the defendant insurance
agency long before the elevator accident. Thus, the transactions
relevant to the procurement of the insurance in question were
those between the plaintiffs and the defendant, Green; the
lower court was in error in refusing the motion of the defendant,
Sullivan, for a directed verdict.
The second issue confronting the court involved the allegation
that the defendants were negligent in failing to procure a
liability insurance policy for the plaintiff covering loss from the
operation of the elevator located on its business premises. The
court recognized the general rule that insurance agents are re-
quired to exercise due care in procuring insurance and are per-
sonally liable for the neglect of that duty.73 The court further
noted that, where an insurance agent undertakes to procure
insurance for a member of the public, the law holds the agent
to the exercise of good faith, reasonable skill, care, and diligence
in performing the obligation.74 In the instant case Green, a
licensed agent, undertook to procure a liability insurance policy
covering the plaintiff's elevator. He delivered, however, a policy
which, through his own fault and neglect, failed to include
coverage for the elevator. The evidence was such as to permit an
inference of actionable negligence on the part of Green, and the
motion for a directed verdict in his favor was properly denied.
Third, the defendant, assuming negligence on his part, con-
tended that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
in the reading of the policy; that, as a matter of law, this would
bar recovery; and that he should have received a directed verdict
on that ground. The court stated that the defense of contributory
negligence is available to an agent against whom the principal
73. See, e.g., Hinds v. United Ins. Co. of America, 248 S.C. 285, 149
S.E.2d 771 (1966); La Tourette v. McMaster, 104 S.C. 501, 89 S.E. 398
(1916). For additional support of this general principle see 43 Aif. JuR. 2d
INSURANcE §§ 174, 176 (1969); 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 172 (1945); 14 J.
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brings an action in tort for negligence.7 5 The court explained,
however, that, while an insured cannot abandon all care, the
rules which require one to inform himself of the terms of his
contract and to take precautions for his own protection are less
exacting where a person deals with his own insurance agent in
the procurement of an insurance contract. In the case at hand
the defendant, Green, was a licensed insurance agent and held
himself out to the public as knowledgeable in the insurance
business; conversely, the plaintiff, while experienced in his own
business, was not experienced in the insurance field and had a
right to rely upon the expert knowledge of the agent. Accord-
ingly, the court declared that it could not be held, as a matter of
law, that the plaintiff should have known from a reading of
the policy that the elevator was not covered. From the de-
fendant's own testimony he, an insurance expert, thought until
after the loss that the elevator was insured under the general
provisions of the policy. Thus, the issue of whether the plaintiff
acted with due care in relying upon the defendant in the pro-
curement of the insurance policy and his representation as to the
coverage afforded by the policy was an issue of fact, and the
lower court acted properly in refusing to direct a verdict on this
ground.
The defendant's fourth and final contention was that judg-
ment should have been entered in his favor because the present
action was barred by the statute of limitations.76 The initial
transaction between the parties occurred in 1956. The basis of
the plaintiff's cause of action was not, however, that the
defendant negligently failed to provide the requested coverage
in 1956, but that he failed to do so in renewing the policy in
1962. The prior transactions were simply relevant to the issue
of whether the defendant undertook to provide the particular
coverage in the policy obtained in 1962. The present action was
begun in the summer of 1962, just a few months after the 1962
policy was issued and the loss sustained. The court found,
therefore, that the action was not barred by the statute of
limitations.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 415, comment b at 275 (1957).
See also 44 CJ.S. IAnmrance § 172 (1945).
76. Under section 10-143 of the 1962 Code of Laws, the action was barred
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V. EVIDENCE: MENTION OF INSURANCE
As previously stated, the South Carolina Supreme Court heard,
in the course of the survey year, four cases in which the issue
involved the interjection of the defendant's liability insurance
into the case.
In Keller v. Pearee-Yooung-Agel C0.7 the plaintiff, a pas-
senger in a truck owned and operated by his brother, was injured
in a collision with a truck of the defendant. During the course
of the trial the plaintiff's brother inadvertently mentioned the
liability insurance of the defendant in response to a question
which did not seek to solicit such information.78 The trial judge
denied a motion for a mistrial, but strongly admonished the jury
to disregard the mention of insurance by the witness. The
defendant appealed from an adverse verdict of the trial court.
The defendant asserted on appeal that the trial judge should
have granted a mistrial because of the mention of liability in-
surance. In answering this contention, the court reiterated that,
as a general rule, a motion for a mistrial is one addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge, whose ruling thereon will
not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion amount-
ing to an error of law.79 The court was of the opinion that the
discretion vested in the trial judge had not been abused.
We are inclined to agree with the statement of the
trial judge that now "nearly everybody knows that
nearly everybody has got insurance." It is, of course,
today a matter of common knowledge that a vast ma-
jority of the motoring public is protected by liability
insurance. While such knowledge provides neither ex-
cuse nor justification for intentionally or deliberately
injecting liability insurance into the trial of a case, still
77. 253 S.C. 395, 171 S.E.2d 352 (1969).
78. The testimony of the plaintiff's brother was as follows:
Q. Did the loss of your truck and the loss of your tools cause
you to lose any time or any money in the work on these houses
in Lexington until you were able to get a replacement truck and
buy this other equipment?
A. I would say that it caused me to lose quite a bit because I
didn't have the proper tools to do the work with and I couldn't
afford to go out and buy more and I didn't have transportation
to get around to these jobs. I mean, I would have to haul
lumber and different things like that and I didn't have no truck
and I called this insurance adjuster, I imagine it was for Pearce-
Young-Angel and he was suppose to come over ....
Record at 2.
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such knowledge is, we think a matter for consideration
in determining the likelihood or probability of preju-
dice to a litigant as a result of insurance having been
inadvertently mentioned. 0 I
The burden of proof was upon the appellant to show not only
error but also resulting prejudice. The court was not convinced
that there was any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
judge, or any resulting prejudice to the appellant; thus, the
judgment of the lower court was affirmed."'
The second case dealing with the mentioning of liability in-
surance during the course of the trial was Walling v. Doe.
2
This action was instituted when the plaintiff, a passenger, was
injured in an automobile-truck collision.8 In instructing the
jury, the trial judge read to them the provisions of a statute
relating to the conditions for recovery under the uninsured
motorist provisions of a liability insurance policy and told them
that all of the conditions of the statute had been met. The trial
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for both actual and
punitive damages, and the defendant appealed therefrom.
The defendant-appellant contended that the jury instruction
was prejudicial and entitled him to a new trial. In a very brief
opinion the court announced that, as a general rule, it is im-
proper in an action for damages to make known to a jury that
there is liability insurance available to pay the amount of any
recovery. The jury instruction was here considered to amount to
80. 253 S.C. at 398, 171 S.E.2d at 354 (1969).
81. As to the inadmissibility of evidence with reference to insurance, the
court quoted from Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92 S.C. 236, 75 S.E. 533
(1912):
The general rule is indisputably established that, when in the
course of a trial incompetent statements of witnesses are brought in
either from accident or when they might be reasonably, though
erroneously, thought by counsel to be competent, the only remedy
that the court can afford is to grant a motion to strike out and
instruct the jury to disregard the testimony. The injury resulting
from the jury having heard the incompetent statement is re-
grettable, but the trial cannot be stopped because of such accidents
and mistakes liable to occur in every trial.
See also Keys v. Winnsboro Granite Co., 76 S.C. 284, 56 S.E. 949 (1906);
Hagins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 72 S.C. 216, 51 S.E. 683 (1905); State v.
Adams, 68 S.C. 421, 47 S.E. 676 (1904); State v. Wideman, 68 S.C. 119, 46
S.E. 769 (1904).
82. 253 S.C. 427, 171 S.E.2d 494 (1969).
83. The driver of the truck left the scene immediately following the col-
lision, and his identity was unknown. The action was then brought against
the unknown driver as "John Doe" in accordance with the provisions of the
Uninsured Motorist Act, to establish liability for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff. See S.C, CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.34 to -750.35 (Supp. 1963).
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reversible error, and the case was, therefore, reversed and re-
manded for a new trial.
Another case in this area of insurance law was Stevens v.
McGaha. 4 In this action three-year-old Gregory Stevens lost
the sight of his left eye when it was lacerated by a sharp,
jagged corner of the metal handle of a chest-type freezer in the
kitchen of his grandfather's home. The trial was commenced and
was completed on the same day; however, when court opened the
next morning, counsel for the defendant moved for a mistrial
because of a newspaper article appearing in the local newspaper.
The article in question contained the erroneous statement that
"the suit is a 'home policy' type in which the grandfather con-
tends that his insurance protects him in the event of a suit from
such an accident."85 After inquiry, the court ascertained that
only two of the jurors had read the article, and they stated that
the article would not affect their verdict in the slightest degree.
Judgment was entered for the plaintiff; the defendant grand-
father appealed.
The grandfather made no claim on appeal that the plaintiff
was responsible for the publication, but simply contended, inter
aria, that the article injected the question of insurance into the
case and that the only satisfactory remedy was a mistrial. An-
swering this assertion, the court emphasized that such was not
the law in this state.
The matter was peculiarly within the discretion of the
trial judge, and we are not persuaded that his refusal
of the motion was unwise. Clearly no abuse of discre-
tion has been shown.86
Thus, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.
Finally, the defendant-appellant in Riddle-Duckworth, Inc.
v. /gulli T,8 alleged error in the denial of the defendant's motion
for a mistrial because of certain testimony referring to liability
insurance. The appellant relied upon the testimony of the
plaintiffs' manager, Duckworth, as to statements made to him
by the defendants after the customer had been injured from the
fall of the elevator and while an attempt was being made to have
84. 253 S.C. 378, 170 S.E2d 758 (1969).
85. Id. at 380-81, 170 S.E2d at 759.
86. Id. at 381, 170 S.E.2d at 759.
87. 253 S.C. 411, 171 S.E.2d 486 (1969). For a detailed discussion of this
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the defendants take care of the loss. The plaintiffs' manager
quoted the defendant, Sullivan, as saying, "Don't worry about
it. Fred (defendant Green) is protected from errors." He
further testified that the defendant, Green, told him, "Don't
worry about it. We will take care of it"; and later, "Don't worry
about it. I just made an error and I am protected and I will take
care of you."
The defendant-appellant argued that the reference in the
foregoing testimony to the defendant, Green, as "protected"
was highly prejudicial in that the only inference to be drawn
therefrom was that the defendant had liability insurance which
would pay any judgment awarded against him. The court
proclaimed that whether or not a motion for a mistrial is
granted rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge and his
ruling will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is
shown.88 The court was not persuaded that there was an abuse
of discretion by the trial judge in the instant case, and the
judgment of the lower court was affirmed.
VI. INsuRA c E LicEsNs FEEs AND TAXES: TAX
ON REINSURANCE PREMI s
In Southeastern Fire Insurance Co. v. South Carolina Taw
Commission,"0 Southeastern reinsured contracts of insurance
issued by Emerald Fire and Casualty Insurance Company. The
South Carolina Tax Commission levied a two percent tax on the
reinsurance premiums collected by Southeastern pursuant to
section 37-130.2 of the South Carolina Code of Laws of 1962.
The tax was paid under protest and a suit instituted to recover
the amount of taxes paid. The trial court held that the premiums
paid Southeastern by Emerald were not taxable because the
contract was one of indemnity and not one of insurance as con-
templated by the statute. The Tax Commission appealed from
this decision.
The court stated on appeal that the sole question for determi-
nation was whether reinsurance contracts came within the scope
of section 37-130.2. As to the construction of the statute, the
court announced that, if a statute is clear and unambiguous,
there is generally no room for construction, and courts must
88. See, e.g., Crocker v. Weathers, 240 S.C. 412, 126 S.F_2d 335 (1962).
89. 253 S.C. 407, 171 S.E.2d 355 (1969).
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give the terms of such a statute their literal meaning.Y° If the
terms of a statute are susceptible of more than one interpreta-
tion, the courts must then construe them to determine the intent
of the legislature. The court noted that it has also been held
that a tax statute is not to be extended beyond the clear import
of its language, and any substantial doubt as to its meaning is
to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.9 1 After reiterating the
aforementioned guidelines, the court then faced the task of
determining if the taxing statute refers to insurance contracts
only, or if it refers to both insurance contracts and reinsurance
contracts.
Section 37-3 of the Code defines "insurance" as follows:
"Insuranee" is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify
another or pay a specified amount upon determinable contin-
gencies." "Reinsurance" is not defined in the Code. However,
there is certainly a difference between insurance and reinsurance.
Reinsurance is defined in American Jurispr udence (Second) as
follows:
"Reinsurance," in the strict sense of the word, may be
defined as a contract whereby one party, the reinsurer,
agrees to indemnify another, the reinsured, either in
whole or in part against loss or liability which the latter
may sustain or incur under a separate and original con-
tract of insurance with a third party, the original in-
sured.92
The court concluded that one of the purposes of reinsurance
is to allow insurers to spread their risk. This is highly desirable,
because it helps to assure the stability of the insurer and increases
the value of the coverage to individuals. Thus, the legislature, by
failing to specify that the taxing statute applies to reinsurance
as well as to insurance, may have been attempting to encourage
reinsurance. In affirming the trial court's decision as to the
non-taxability of the reinsurance premiums, the court stated the
following:
We do not think it was the intent of the legislature
that an insured person bear the brunt of more than one
two per cent tax. Although the tax is not levied against
90. See generally McCollum v. Snipes, 213 S.C. 254, 49 S.E.2d 12 (1948);
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Spartanburg, 185 S.C. 313, 194 S.E.
139 (1937).
91. See, e.g., Coble Dairy Products Corp. v. Livingston, 239 S.C. 401, 123
S.E.2d 301 (1961).
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the insurer, it is inescapable that the cost of doing in-
surance business including the payment of taxes levied
must be passed on to the consumer.9 3
VII. GISLATION
The 1970 General Assembly enacted insurance legislation that
may substantially affect South Carolina insurance law and
practice. The act applies only to that portion of a policy of
automobile insurance providing automobile bodily injury and
property damage liability coverage and to the provisions therein
relating to uninsured motorists coverage.
The grounds for cancellation of an insurance policy by an
insurer represent the most significant change effected by the
enactment:
No insurer shall cancel a policy except for one or the
other of the following specified reasons:
(1) Nonpayment of premium; or
(2) The driver's license or motor vehicle registration
of the named insured or of any other operator who
either resides in the same household or customarily op-
erates an automobile insured under the policy has been
under suspension or revocation during the policy period
or, if the policy is a renewal, during its policy period or
the one hundred eighty days immediately preceding its
effective date.
9 4
Also included in the legislation is the provision that no cancel-
lation or refusal to renew a policy of automobile insurance by an
insurer shall be effective unless the insurer shall deliver or mail,
to the named insured at the address shown in the policy, a
written notice of the cancellation or refusal to renew. Immed-
iately following the foregoing provision are five mandates that
must accompany such notice.95
It is further provided that any insured may, within fifteen
days of the receipt of notice of cancellation or notice of inten-
93. 253 S.C. at 411, 171 S.E2d at 357.
94, "An Act Regulating The Writing, Cancellation of Or Refusal to Renew
Policies of Automobile Insurance; Imposing Powers and Duties on the Chief
Insurance Commissioner Therefor; Providing For Hearings and Providing
Penalties For Violations," R1335, April 29, 1970, Section 4.
95. Id. at Section 5.
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tion not to renew, request in writing that the Insurance Com-
missioner review such action of the insurer.96 Section 11 of the
act sets forth the penalties and consequences to which the in-
surer may be subjected for non-compliance with any resulting
order or regulation from the Commissioner.
DoNATD V. MyErs
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